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Phorm, mitm, and https
{x-posted to alt.privacy and alt.computer.security}
A number of UK ISPs have signed up for Phorm. This is, IMO, pretty bad. Phorm say that they ignore anything going over https. For the purposes of this thread, image a rogue, black-hat, Phorm.[1] Or even a rogue, black- hat, ISP. Ann, at her pc, logs into her internet "bob's Bank" bank account. What are the steps involved between Ann's browser and the Bob's web page? Is there anyway for EvePhorm to mount a serios mitm attack? Is there anyway for EveBlackHatISP to mount a serious mitm attack? I'm only really interested in attacks that allow Eves to either see the financial data, or worse. I'd be interested to know what kind of mild data leaks would be available. Many thanks for any replies. |
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#2 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
bealoid <.uk> wrote in
news:Xns9A4D94296AC6FYAsfKJXSTO@194.117.143.37: You need to read up on SSL. Simplifying a bit, as long as: 1) the bank (or other destination site) has properly implemented its pages (doesn't mix http & https, doesn't switch away, etc.), and 2) you actually *check* its SSL certificate to make sure it's for whomever you're trying to connect to, you're bombproof. Regards, PS This assumes, of course, that your computer is not infested with spyware, Trojans, and the like and that you practice safe computing by securing your browser, flushing caches and cookies, etc. or even signing off after a secure session. In short, SSL protects communications in transit, it doesn't protect against compromise (and stupid mistakes) at either end point, especially by a user unreflectively clicking on stuff he shouldn't (slightly misspelled URLs, etc.). |
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#3 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
"nemo_outis" <> wrote in
news:Xns9A4D5BFC23FD9pqwertyu@64.59.135.159: > bealoid <.uk> wrote in > news:Xns9A4D94296AC6FYAsfKJXSTO@194.117.143.37: > > You need to read up on SSL. I know! I've got the RFCs and such now. > > Simplifying a bit, as long as: > > 1) the bank (or other destination site) has properly implemented its > pages (doesn't mix http & https, doesn't switch away, etc.), and > 2) you actually *check* its SSL certificate to make sure it's for > whomever you're trying to connect to, > > you're bombproof. I really thought this was the case. I'm having a gentle argument in a virginmedia supprt newsgroup. > > Regards, > > PS This assumes, of course, that your computer is not infested with > spyware, Trojans, and the like and that you practice safe computing by > securing your browser, flushing caches and cookies, etc. or even > signing off after a secure session. In short, SSL protects > communications in transit, it doesn't protect against compromise (and > stupid mistakes) at either end point, especially by a user > unreflectively clicking on stuff he shouldn't (slightly misspelled > URLs, etc.). Well, yes. The number of machines that get trojaned by users clicking the "yes, please instal malware" buttons isn't re-assuring. :-( |
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#4 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
128k SSL is crackable, with considerable time and effort.
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#5 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
ugh wrote:
> 128k SSL 128k? Don't you mean 128 bit? > Some illiterates talking about things they don't know and don't understand. > That's obviously a 40 bit key, dude! |
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#6 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
ugh wrote:
> 128k SSL is crackable, with considerable time and effort. Please... get your information about cryptanalysis from some source other than random clueless rubes posting to some Yayhoo forum and/or learn to read for comprehension. First of all it's "bits", not "k". Second of all, if you combined the computing power of every digital device on the face of the planet and directed that effort toward cracking a single 128 bit SSL session it would take you significantly longer than the Earth has existed to crack it, and generate enough heat to vaporize this corner of the Galaxy in the process. The mathematics behind that is undeniable. Modern strong encryption is virtually uncrackable. Period. If any weaknesses exist they're going to be in the implementation, not the crypto itself. |
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#7 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
"Sebastian G." <> wrote in
news:: > ugh wrote: > >> 128k SSL > > > 128k? Don't you mean 128 bit? > >> >> 124032 > > > Some illiterates talking about things they don't know and don't > understand. > >> > > That's obviously a 40 bit key, dude! > Exactly right, Sebastian! Regards, |
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#8 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
On Sun, 24 Feb 2008 21:52:34 -0500, ugh wrote:
> 128k SSL is crackable, with considerable time and effort. I should say lol -- An Explanation Of The Need To Be "Anonymous" |
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#9 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
On Sun, 24 Feb 2008 23:13:56 +0100 (CET)
Anonymous <> wrote: > The mathematics behind that is undeniable. Modern strong encryption is > virtually uncrackable. Period. If any weaknesses exist they're going > to be in the implementation, not the crypto itself. Unfortunately this is very inaccurate. The mathematics are deniable, because there are no security proofs. There is strong evidence towards good security, but nothing is proven here. So currently, we can only assume security, not take it for granted. Regards, Ertugrul. -- |
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#10 |
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Re: Phorm, mitm, and https
Ertugrul =?UTF-8?B?U8O2eWxlbWV6?= <> wrote in news:fpu314$9u4$02
$: > On Sun, 24 Feb 2008 23:13:56 +0100 (CET) > Anonymous <> wrote: > >> The mathematics behind that is undeniable. Modern strong encryption is >> virtually uncrackable. Period. If any weaknesses exist they're going >> to be in the implementation, not the crypto itself. > > Unfortunately this is very inaccurate. The mathematics are deniable, > because there are no security proofs. There is strong evidence towards > good security, but nothing is proven here. So currently, we can only > assume security, not take it for granted. I agree, but the evidence is very strong for some versions algorithms, no? And, until someone does factorisation, cracking an encrypted message is almost always going to rely on the implementation of the algorithm in software, the deployment of software on the machine, human weaknesses in picking good passwords etc. |
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